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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN G. POWERS, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent~ 
vs. 
l\IARVIN S. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant~ 
Case No. 
vs. I 9694 
El\IMA STILLMAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ., 
vs. 
MARVIN S. TAYLOR, 
I 
Defendant and Appellant, I 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case the Plaintiffs and Respondents brought 
separate actions against the Defendant and Appellant, 
seeking to recover damages caused by trespass of 
Defendant's and Appellant's horses on the real property 
of the Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
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The actions were consolidated for the purposes of 
this trial. 
The cases were tried before a jury and it was not 
disputed that the horses trespassed upon the property 
of the Respondents a ntunber of titnes during the past 
three years. The exact nun1ber of titnes was never as-
certained. 
The amount of da1nages sustained by reason of 
the trespass was nil, according to the testitnony of all 
of the witnesses. Neither of the Respondents paid any 
money to repair any darnages they might have sustained 
by reason of the trespasses. 
The jury found in favor of the Respondents ami 
against the Appellant and in the case of John J. Powers 
vs. l\Iarvin S. Taylor, they awarded $1,000.00 actual 
damage; $2,500.00 punitive damages and in the matter 
of Emma Stillman vs. Marvin S. Taylor, they awarded 
$350.00 actual damages. Upon the Appellant's motion 
for a new trial the Court ordered the amount of the 
judgment in the case of John J. Powers vs. Marvin 
S. Taylor to be reduced and a remittitur in the amount 
of $1,000.00 of the exemplary damages be made. It is 
from these judgments that the Defendant and Appel-
lant now appeals. 
STATEl\IENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. The Court erred in permitting the Plaintiff and 
Respondents to present evidence to the jury that was 
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incompetent and not in any way related to the trespass 
and in point of time was not within the time encom-
passed by the pleadings. 
2. The Court erred in its instruction to the jury 
as to the standard for measuring the amount of dam-
ages. 
3. The Court erred in instructing the jury that it 
could find punitive or exemplary damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court erred in permitting the Plaintiffs 
and Respondents to present evidence to the jury that 
was incompetent and not in any way related to the 
trespass and in point of time was not within the time 
encompassed by the pleadings. The record is replete 
with the testimony that was permitted by the Court 
over the objection of Counsel: 
Record:p 12, L 10; p 13, L 16; p 13, L 27; p 14, L 19; 
p 15,L 19; p 16, L 30; p 17, L 4; P 17, L 10; p 22, L 17; 
p 23, L 3; p 30, L 12-24; p 45, I.~ 22; p 46, L 5; p 57, 
L 20; p 60, L 12; p 61, L 13-30; p 62, L 1-30; p 63, 
~ 
L 1-17; p 64, L 15-30; p 65, L 1-30; p 66, L 1-5; p 67, 
L 4-12; p 71, L 30; p 74, L 11; p 75, L 1-30; p 76, 
L 1-17; p 98, L 13-23; p 147, L 9; p 152, L 2; p 154, 
L 13-24; p 160, L 7-9; p 196, L 21; p 196, L 24; p 197, 
L 1-30. 
And while it is true that the Court at the conclusion 
of Respondent's testimony and evidence instructed the 
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jury that they were not to regard this testi1nony, neYer-
theless its frequent repetitions and the fact that it had 
been presented to the jury, the 1nere telling the jury 
to disregard it does not erase it frmn their n1inds and 
Inemories. And the only purpose of this testi1nony was 
to infimne the passions of the jurors so that they would 
not think clearly in their deliberations as to the anwunt 
of damages that had been done. 
2. The Court erred in its instruction to the jury as 
to the standard for 1neasuring the amount of dmnages. 
In both of these cases the damage sustained was 
neither permanent or irreparable and there was no 
evidence that the Respondents or either of them ex-
pended any money whatsoever in repairing any damage 
that might haYe been caused by reason of the trespasses. 
It would be a fair statement to say that the only 
damages sustained by the Respondents, or either of 
them, was dmnage to the plants, none of which were 
destroyed and all of which recovered from any damage 
and continued to grow and develop. Apparently, al1 
of the plants complained of were annuals, and most 
of the trespasses occurred during the season of the 
year when these plants were neither blooming nor 
growing. The correct and proper instruction to the 
jury for damages is found in Jury Instructions for 
Utah, number 90.40, Damages to Property which re· 
cites in effect, "in awarding such damages, you should 
award such sum as will reasonably compensate Plaintiff 
for damage to his property as a proximate result of the 
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mJury by the Defendant. That sum is equal to the 
difference in the fair market value of the property 
im1nediately before and immediately after the injury. 
If the property has been repaired or is capable of 
repair, so as to restore its fair market value as it existed 
im1nediately before the injury at an expense less than 
the difference in value, then the measure of damage is 
the expenes of such repair rather than the difference 
in value," or instruction number 90.42, "in awarding 
such damage, you may award such sum as will reason-
ably compensate the Plaintiff for his pecuniary loss 
suffered by him through the loss of use of the property 
during the time reasonably necessary to repair the 
damage resulting from the injury. The sum is ordinarily 
the reasonable rental value of the property for the 
period of time above mentioned. The Utah cases and 
the other cases involving damages as a result of trespass 
by animals follow the criterion or standard in the above 
instructions awarding or arriving at the amount or 
Ineasure of damages. 
Utah cases involving trespass by animals which 
were examined by Counsel are: Anderson vs. Jensen, 
:2()5 Pac. 7 45; Jones vs. Blythe, 93 Pac. 994; Kendell 
vs. )lclntire, 203 Pac. 653; lVIower vs. Olsen, 164 Pac. 
482; Naylor vs. F,loor, 170 Pac. 971; Thomas vs. Blythe, 
137 Pac. 396. 
In each of these cases, the amount of damages 
awarded and sustained by the Court bore a direct re-
lationship to the cost of replacing Plaintitl''s property 
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' 'to its condition before the trespass. Even though smne 
of the cases involved wilt'ull trespass where the owner 
drive his ani1nals upon Plaintiff's land, and smne in-
volved repeated trespasses, no mention was Inade of 
exemplary damages. 
The earlier cases of trespass apparently held that 
unless acts of Defendant were wilfull in causing or 
permitting the trespass that no recovery could be had. 
The more recent cases seemed to have changed that rule 
and the Defendant is held liable for damages for acci-
dental trespass as Inuch as for wilfull or intentional 
trespass. 
Livingston vs. Thornley, 280 Pac. 1042; Nelson 
vs. Tanner, 194 Pac. 2nd 468; Winters vs. Turner, 
178 Pac. 816. 
3. The Court erred in instructing the jury that it 
could find punitive or exemplary damages. 
The cases hold that to recover punitive or exem-
plary damages in cases of trespass of animals there 
1nust be three conditions, namely: 
1. The trespass 1nust be wilfull. 
2. The trespass must have been caused as the result 
of malice. 
3. There must have been some significant mental 
or emotional disturbance on the part of the Plaintiff. 
In any event, only if there is actual damage should 
the Court permit a consideration of exemplary damages. 
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Livingston vs. Utah-Colorado Land & Livestock Com-
pany, (Colorado), 103 Pac. 2nd 684. 
28 ALR 2nd 1076-SHOCK-,VITNESSING 
PROPERTY- DAMAGE. Although the Anglo-
American Courts have freely approved verdicts includ-
ing awards for compensation for mental suffering 
where this element of injury was accon1panied or pre-
ceded by a discernible, physical, personal injury. They 
have been extren1ely reluctant to authorize recovery 
for mental disturbances standing alone or, to a some-
what lesser degree, for physical injuries caused solely 
by such a mental disturbance unaccompanied by a 
contemporaneous physical injury. Without going into 
an extended discussion on the reasons relied upon hy 
the Courts in denying recovery from mental disturb-
ance unaccompanied by physical injury, it may be said 
that the rule has been justified in various cases and at 
Yarious times on the grounds : 
1. That the Plaintiff's right to freedom from 
mental disturbance is not one which the law undertakes 
to protect, so that one who works a purely mental 
injury has breeched no duty and committed no wrong. 
2. That in most cases such injuries are so remote 
from the normal foreseeable consequences of the wrong 
involved that they cannot be said to have been a pro xi-
mate cause and 
3. That such damages are so subjective that they 
are beyond the capacity of the legal process to investi-
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gate and evaluate. so that to entertain clain1s based 
thereon would open the door to fraud and greatly swell 
the burden of litigation. 
However, it has been quite generally recognized 
that where the Defendant is charged with a wilfull tort 
rather than merely a negligent injury, and especially 
where the tort is comtnitted under circumstances of' 
positiYe malice or ill-will which might reasonably be 
expected to lead to considerable disturbances to the 
Plaintiff, compensatory damages for such mental dis-
turbance or its physical consequences may properly be 
a warded, even where aside from the property tort, no 
cause of action would have arisen. 
Although there are a few cases allowing such 
datnages, the Courts in general appear to be extremely 
reluctant to allow recovery for mental disturbance 
occasioned by a merely negligent injury to chattels. 
Page 1089, MENTAL DISTURBANCE 
CAUSED SOLELY BY CONCERN FOR PROP-
ERTl". Even where there is no element of personal 
danger or physical discomfort involved and the mental 
disturbance complained of arises solely from the Plain-
tiff's distress at the injury to his property interests, 
recovery for such mental anguish has been allowed in 
a nutnber of cases where it appeared that the Defend-
ant's act amounted to a wilfull and malicious trespass 
and that the 1nental anguish was a proximate result 
of this wrongful act. So, mental anguish has been held 
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an element of compensatory damages for wilfully com-
ing on the Plaintiff's land and cutting trees. 
In other cases of trespass or injury to real property 
where the mental disturbance complained of arose solely 
as an incident of property damage and the elements of 
malice or wilfullness did not appear, the Courts have 
appeared reluctant to allow such damages. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Court 
erred: 
1. In permitting the Plaintiffs and Respondent to 
present evidence to the jury which was incompetent 
and the only purpose to be served was to arouse the 
actions and prejudices of the jury against the De-
fendant. 
2. The Court erred in its instructions to the jury 
as to the standards for the measuring of the amount of 
damages sustained by the Plaintiffs and Respondent. 
3. That the Court erred in instructing the jury 
that it could find punitive or exemplary damages. 
DAVID H. BYBEE 
SPENCER L. HAYCOCK 
Attorneys for the 
Defendant and Appellant 
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